| 联盟结构合作博弈的平等盈余分配 |
| The ESD solution of the cooperative game with a coalition structure |
| 摘要点击 82 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2022-11-17 修订日期：2024-01-11 |
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| 中文关键词 联盟结构; 平等盈余分配; 加权解; 合作博弈 |
| 英文关键词 Coalition structure; Equal surplus division; Weighted value; Cooperative game |
| 基金项目 中文“非完全信息联盟结构博弈理论及在服务型制造跨链合作中的应用”项目批准号：72171024 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 于晓辉 | 北京物资学院 双碳研究院&
物流学院 | 101149 | | 王文举 | 北京物资学院双 碳研究院&
经济学院 | | | 张强 | 北京理工大学 管理与经济学院 | | | 张志强 | 北京物资学院 双碳研究院&
物流学院 | | | 商盈润 | 北京物资学院 双碳研究院&
物流学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 在联盟结构合作博弈中, 探讨了优先联盟议价能力对其局中人收益分配的影响, 构建了基于“平等盈余分 配”(即ESD解)的分配方法. 首先, 基于ESD解及其扩展形式, 将优先联盟的议价能力转化为其收益分配的动态权重. 然后, 基于Owen型值二步法构建了体现局中人加入大联盟前后收益差异的联盟结构合作博弈“解”(即: 两种广义加 权平等盈余分配), 并进行了公理化论证. 通过对比两种广义加权平等盈余分配方案, 分析可知: 企业自身实力的增 强会降低其加入到联盟结构合作的意愿, 但是必然会提高大联盟中其他优先联盟的合作意愿, 而不一定会增强其同 一优先联盟中其他伙伴的合作意愿; 当企业经济实力的增强时, 应该通过合理地设置优先联盟的动态权重来保证 其同一优先联盟伙伴的合作意愿. 因此, 广义平等盈余分配可以帮助局中人评估可能的合作分配和合作方式, 从而 选择最优的合作形式. |
| 英文摘要 |
| In the cooperative game with a coalition structure, we discuss the influence of bargaining power of priori coalition on the distribution of its players’ profits, and some new solutions are gotten by “equal surplus distribution”(i.e., ESD)solution. Firstly, based on the ESD solution and its extended form, the bargaining power of the priori coalition is converted into the dynamic weight of its profit distribution. Then, this paper constructs the “solutions” of the cooperative game with a coalition structure (i.e., two kinds of generalized ESD solutions) based on the two-step method of Owen type value. The proposed solutions can reflect the profit difference between the players before and after joining the grand coalition, and they have been axiomatized. By comparing two generalized weighted equal surplus distribution schemes, we get that the enhancement of a company’s own strength will reduce his willingness to participate in the cooperation as a member of priori coalition, but it will inevitably increase the willingness to cooperate with other priori coalitions in the grand coalition, rather than necessarily enhancing the willingness to cooperate with other partners in the same priori coalition. When the economic strength of an enterprise increases, the dynamic weight of the priori coalition should be reasonably set to ensure the willingness of his partners in the same pori coalition to cooperate with him. Therefore, the generalized equal surplus distribution can help players evaluate possible cooperative allocation and cooperatiorin methods, and thus choose the optimal form of cooperation. |
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