| 基于产品质量差异的最优以旧换新授权策略 |
| The optimal trade-in authorization strategy with product quality differences |
| 摘要点击 95 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2022-09-26 修订日期：2024-01-12 |
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| 中文关键词 以旧换新; 第三方平台; 授权策略; 质量差异化; 消费者渠道偏好 |
| 英文关键词 Trade-in; Third-party platform; Authorization strategy; Product quality differences; Consumer channel preference |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 钱志峰 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | 611731 | | 杨淑荔 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | | | 柴俊武 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | 611731 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 以旧换新是实现国家“双碳”目标的重要路径. 大量第三方(3P)以旧换新平台出现并进入市场, 这为制造商开拓了新的销售渠道, 但也不可避免地会蚕食制造商的原有渠道. 为了避免渠道冲突, 许多制造商采取向3P平台授权质量差异化产品的策略, 但制造商选择何种授权策略的决策动机尚不清晰. 本文构建了一个由制造商和3P平台组成的两周期Stackelberg模型, 旨在探索当面临3P平台的进入威胁下制造商如何策略性地授权不同质量的产品, 并确定最优授权策略的边界条件. 研究表明, 只有当消费者渠道偏好差异较大时, 制造商才偏好于授权高质量产品, 而较高的质量差异水平和渠道偏好系数会促使其授权低质量产品. 此外, 3P平台也可以从制造商的最优授权策略下获益, 实现双赢. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Many third-party (3P) platform firms with the main business of trade-in appear and enter the market to achieve the national goals of carbon neutralization targets. This helps develop new sales channels for manufacturers, but inevitably encroaches on the manufacturer’s sales channel. Therefore, this paper constructs a two-period Stackelberg-game model composed of a manufacturer and a 3P platform to explore how the manufacturer strategically authorizes products of different qualities when facing the threat of 3P platform entry. Also, we determine the boundary conditions for the optimal trade-in authorization strategy. The results show that when the consumers’ channel preference coefficient is high, the manufacturer prefers authorizing high-quality products to the 3P platform. Higher quality difference levels and consumer channel preference coefficients urge manufacturers to choose a low-quality product authorizing strategy. The optimal trade-in authorization strategy will also benefit the 3Ps platform, creating a win-win situation that will help both sides build cooperation. |
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