| 碳税下授权再制造回收渠道选择与供应链协调 |
| Recycling channel strategies and supply chain coordination for authorized remanufacturing under carbon tax policy |
| 摘要点击 93 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2026-01-13 修订日期：2026-06-26 |
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| 中文关键词 授权再制造;碳税政策;回收渠道;博弈论 |
| 英文关键词 Authorizing remanufacturing; Carbon tax policy; Recycling channel; Game theory |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目）差异化碳税对再制造模式选择及碳减排技术提升影响研究 |
| 投稿方向 绿色供应链 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 夏西强 | 郑州大学商学院 | 450001 | | 谷琼阳 | 郑州大学商学院 | | | 黄兆涵* | 郑州大学商学院 | 450001 | | 冯严超 | 郑州大学商学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对碳税政策与知识产权保护背景下的闭环供应链渠道决策问题, 基于授权再制造模式构建由原始设备制造商、再制造商和零售商组成的三级博弈模型. 采用三阶段Stackelberg博弈方法, 比较制造商回收、再制造商回收与零售商回收三种渠道下的定价、需求、利润、环境影响与消费者剩余. 模型中引入碳税水平、消费者对再制造产品的偏好程度以及废旧产品回收规模系数. 研究发现: 回收渠道选择通过授权费与再制品价格间接影响市场供需, 新产品价格保持稳定. 当碳税水平较高且消费者对再制造产品偏好较强时, 原始制造商回收渠道能够实现经济、环境与社会效益的"三方共赢". 碳税对供应链成员影响各异, 再制造商利润随碳税增加而上升, 原始制造商与零售商利润下降; 废旧产品回收率受消费者偏好与碳税共同驱动. |
| 英文摘要 |
| To address channel decision problems in closed-loop supply chains under carbon tax and intellectual property protection, a three-tier game model based on authorized remanufacturing is constructed, consisting of an original equipment manufacturer(OEM), a remanufacturer, and a retailer. A three-stage Stackelberg game compares pricing, demand, profit, environmental impact, and consumer surplus under three recycling channels: OEM-led, remanufacturer-led, and retailer-led. The model incorporates carbon tax, consumer preference, and collection scale coefficient. Results indicate that channel choice indirectly affects supply and demand through licensing fees and remanufactured prices, while new product prices remain stable. When carbon tax is high and consumer preference strong, the OEM-led channel achieves a triple win. Remanufacturer profit increases with carbon tax, whereas OEM and retailer profits decline. Consumer preference and carbon tax jointly drive the recovery rate of end-of-life products. |
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