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基于医生行为的远程会诊申请方参与激励机制设计
Incentive mechanism design for teleconsultation application hospital based on the behavior of doctors
摘要点击 6  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-11-26  修订日期:2026-01-24
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中文关键词  远程会诊; 激励机制; 医生行为; 博弈论
英文关键词  teleconsultation; incentive mechanism; doctor's behavior; game theory
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目(72501263); 国家资助博士后研究人员计划(GZC20241540); 中国博士后基金面上项目(2025M770800);中原科技创新领军人才项目(244200510047)
投稿方向  医疗运营管理
作者单位邮编
周翠华 郑州大学管理学院 450001
高盼 郑州大学管理学院 
卫东乐 郑州大学管理学院 
翟运开* 郑州大学管理学院 450001
中文摘要
      面对我国医疗资源不足且分布不均的挑战, 远程会诊虽理论上可推动分级诊疗实现供需均衡, 实践中却陷入``叫好不叫座'困境. 本文突破现有文献将医院简化为``黑匣子'的局限, 基于管理者与医生目标冲突的运营复杂性, 构建二者在远程会诊中的博弈模型, 聚焦探讨按盈余分成机制相对于传统按诊疗量补贴机制的激励作用. 发现: (1) 按盈余分成机制特定条件下可提升远程会诊利用率, 但反直观地, 当线下转诊边际效益较低时, 其可通过降低传统线下患者量而非转诊患者量来实现这一效果; (2) 即便盈余分成比例较高, 管理者仍倾向采用盈余分成机制; (3) 两种机制下, 博弈双方均可在特定条件下达成共赢. 本文通过解构多主体博弈揭示远程会诊利用率不足的微观机制, 为分级诊疗与数字医疗融合完善提供新范式.
英文摘要
      Faced with insufficient and unevenly distributed medical resources in China, teleconsultation—though theoretically able to balance supply and demand by promoting the implementation of the hierarchical medical system—has fallen into the ``Popularity but no practical effect" dilemma in practice. Moving beyond the "black box" hospital assumption, this study constructs a game-theoretic model incorporating the operational complexity arising from the differing goals of hospital managers and doctors. It compares the incentive effects of a profit-sharing mechanism with traditional fee-for-service subsidies. Key findings include: (1) Profit-sharing can increase teleconsultation use, but counterintuitively, when the marginal benefit of offline referrals is low, this is achieved by reducing traditional offline patients rather than referrals; (2) Managers prefer profit-sharing even at a high sharing ratio; (3) Both mechanisms can enable win-win outcomes under specific conditions. This multi-agent analysis reveals the micro-mechanisms of low adoption, offering a novel paradigm for integrating hierarchical and digital healthcare.
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