| 拉式供应链中的买方融资策略：提前支付与反向保理 |
| Buyer Financing in a Pull Supply Chain: Early Payment Vs. Reverse Factoring |
| 摘要点击 82 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2025-10-15 修订日期：2026-05-16 |
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| 中文关键词 供应链管理; 提前支付; 反向保理; 博弈论 |
| 英文关键词 supply chain management; early payment; reverse factoring; game theory |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 投稿方向 供应链金融 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 孙书艺 | 天津大学 | 300072 | | 王诗涵 | 天津大学 | | | 兰燕飞* | 天津大学 | | | 高荣 | 河北工业大学 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 因传统融资方式效率低下且成本高昂, 中小企业往往难以获得低成本的生产运营融资. 为缓解中小制造企业的融资困境, 提前支付融资与反向保理被视为传统融资模式的替代方案. 我们基于Stackelberg博弈框架构建了拉动式供应链模型, 其中资本充裕的零售商作为领导者, 在销售季节向资本受限的制造商下达订单. 本研究探讨了三种融资模式: 银行融资, 提前支付融资和反向保理. 研究发现, 当单位机会成本与延迟付款利率均较高时, 零售商更倾向于选择反向保理以实现更高利润; 但在其他条件下, 提前支付也可能是更优选择. 反直觉的是, 对零售商而言, 买方融资(提前支付或反向保理)并非在所有情况下均优于银行融资-尤其是当机会成本高且生产成本低时. 然而, 制造商始终偏好买方融资. 我们进一步发现, 仅在买方融资下可实现供应链双赢: 当机会成本与生产成本均较低时, 提前支付融资促成双赢, 而当生产成本低且延迟付款利率高时, 反向保理实现双赢. 拓展分析表明, 非线性机会成本与制造商初始资金水平不改变上述定性结论. 本研究为零售商在不同成本与利率情境下选择最优融资策略提供了理论依据与管理启示. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Obtaining inexpensive financing for production and operations is often difficult for small and medium-sized manufacturers because traditional financing options are inefficient and costly. To mitigate the financing challenges of small and medium-sized manufacturers, early payment financing and reverse factoring are considered alternatives to traditional financing modes. We develop a pull supply chain model using a Stackelberg game framework, where a capital-abundant retailer acts as the leader and orders from a capital-constrained manufacturer during the selling season. Three financing modes are explored in this study: bank financing, early payment financing and reverse factoring. We find that both early payment financing and reverse factoring can alleviate the financing dilemma of the manufacturer in low-cost industries, while for the high-cost one, reverse factoring is more effective. Our findings provide guidance and insights into the decision-making processes regarding when different types of buyer financing should be adopted. |
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