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双寡头竞争中的绿色产品升级策略与囚徒困境
Green product upgrading strategies in duopoly competition and the prisoner’s dilemma
摘要点击 28  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-10-03  修订日期:2025-12-09
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中文关键词  产品绿色升级;绿色消费者;双寡头竞争;Hotelling模型;囚徒困境
英文关键词  Green product upgrades; green consumers; duopoly competition; Hotelling model; prisoner’s dilemma
基金项目  
投稿方向  供应链管理
作者单位邮编
李秀邦 天津大学 300072
张建雄 天津大学 
张世晨* 天津大学 300072
陈嘉俊 天津大学 
中文摘要
      在绿色消费意识提升的背景下,企业是否实施绿色产品升级成为影响竞争力的关键战略.本文构建Hotelling双寡头竞争模型,将消费者细分为普通消费者和绿色消费者(其中绿色消费者对绿色产品有更高的支付意愿),分析企业在绿色升级中的战略互动. 研究发现:(1)企业均衡升级策略由绿色边际效用和初始升级成本共同决定. 绿色升级并非必然有利,其盈利性取决于绿色边际效用.(2)当绿色边际效用处于中等水平时,市场可能陷入“囚徒困境”: 尽管双方升级可实现帕累托改进,但理性选择导致双方均不升级成为纳什均衡.(3)消费者绿色关注度对利润的作用随竞争结构而变: 在仅一方升级时,其提升会增加双方利润;而在双方均升级时,会增强对称竞争、压缩利润. 此外,普通消费者比例对未升级企业利润呈倒U型,竞争强度与企业利润呈U 型关系. 本文为企业绿色升级决策提供理论依据与管理启示.
英文摘要
      Amid rising green consumption awareness, firms’ decisions on green product upgrading have become strategically crucial. Using a Hotelling duopoly model with regular and green consumers (the latter having higher willingness to pay for green products), this study examines firms’ strategic interactions. Results show that: (1) Equilibrium upgrading strategies depend on both green marginal utility and initial upgrade cost, and upgrading is profitable only when green marginal utility is sufficiently high. (2) At moderate levels of green marginal utility, the market may fall into a prisoner’s dilemma: although mutual upgrading yields a Pareto improvement, mutual non-upgrading emerges as the Nash equilibrium. (3) The effect of consumer green awareness on profits varies by competitive structure: when only one firm upgrades, greater green awareness raises both firms’ profits; when both upgrade, stronger green awareness intensifies symmetric competition and reduces profits. Additionally, the share of regular consumers has an inverted U-shaped effect on the non-upgrading firm’s profit, while competition intensity shows a U-shaped relationship with profits. The study offers theoretical and managerial insights for firms’ green upgrading strategies.
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