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政府信息披露下农产品供应链定价与生产决策
Pricing and production decisions in agricultural supply chains under government information provision
摘要点击 31  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-09-09  修订日期:2026-03-07
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中文关键词  农产品供应链;信息披露;利他偏好;绿色生产
英文关键词  agricultural supply chain; information provision; altruistic preferences; green production
基金项目  国家自然科学基金(72302106; 72471094);江西省教育厅科学技术资助项目(GJJ2200558)
投稿方向  农产品供应链;企业运营管理
作者单位邮编
张雄* 江西财经大学 510641
孙翠英 江西财经大学 
周永务 华南理工大学 
谢军 江西财经大学 
中文摘要
      考虑了政府信息披露政策和零售商利他偏好与消费者绿色偏好行为因素, 建立潜在市场需求和产出双重不确定性下农产品供应链定价与生产决策博弈模型, 探究政府信息披露政策与零售商利他偏好行为的影响. 研究发现, 政府信息披露政策不仅能够提高农户利润, 同时也增加零售商利润. 并且, 随着政府分享的市场需求信息越准确, 农户和零售商能够获得更多的利润. 零售商的利他偏好行为会促使其提高收购价格让利农户, 但也会驱使农户提高绿色生产水平吸引更多的消费者, 从而有利于零售商, 进而实现双赢. 最后, 农户采用绿色生产方式会激励农户提高种植面积以及零售商提高收购价格, 使得农户自身和零售商都获利.
英文摘要
      In the agricultural supply chain, this paper examines the effects of government information provision policy, the retailer's altruistic preferences, and consumers' green preference behaviors. Based on these factors, a game-theoretic model for pricing and production decisions is established under the dual uncertainties of potential market demand and output. We find that the government's information provision policy not only increases the farmer's profit but also boosts the retailer's profit. Moreover, as the government shares more accurate information about potential market demand, both the farmer and the retailer are able to make more profit. The retailer's altruistic behavior motivates an increase in the purchase price, thus benefiting the farmer. In turn, the farmer enhances green production levels to attract more consumers, ultimately enabling the retailer to secure greater profit and realize a win-win outcome. Finally, the adoption of green production by the farmer will drive the farmer to increase the planting area and the retailer to increase the purchase price, which will be profitable for both the farmer and the retailer.
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