| 虚假观看背景下内容平台广告策略研究 |
| Platform advertising strategies in the context of fake views |
| 摘要点击 38 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2025-05-24 修订日期：2025-11-09 |
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| 中文关键词 内容平台；虚假观看；广告收益模式；定价策略；博弈论 |
| 英文关键词 content platform; fake views; advertising revenue model;pricing strategy; game theory |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 投稿方向 平台经济与定价策略 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 李开颜 | 天津大学 | 300072 | | 王荣慧* | 天津大学 | 300072 | | 南国芳 | 天津大学 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 考虑一个采用广告收益模式的内容平台, 该平台通过内容创作者提供的内容吸引用户, 进而吸引广告商入驻. 针对平台上的虚假观看问题, 研究内容创作者对是否制造虚假观看的决策及虚假观看策略对平台广告定价和广告商入驻策略的影响. 研究表明, 在平台提供较低和较高的创作佣金时, 提供低价值内容的创作者更倾向于制造虚假观看. 最优虚假观看量受到创作者间内容价值差异、消费者多归属成本和平台佣金水平的影响. 虚假观看促使平台提高广告费用, 且在佣金较低时, 平台内广告数量会有所增加. 虚假观看在佣金较高时能增加未制造虚假观看的创作者的利润, 而在佣金较低时则能增加平台利润. 值得注意的是, 在佣金适中时, 虚假观看能够提升消费者剩余. 研究结论为内容平台治理虚假观看现象提供了理论支持. |
| 英文摘要 |
| This paper examines a content platform that adopts an advertising revenue model, attracting users through content provided by two creators and monetizing their attention via advertiser participation. In the context of fake views, the study investigates the strategic decision of content creators to generate fake views and analyzes their impact on the platform's advertising pricing and advertiser participation. The results show that low-value content creators are more likely to generate fake views when the platform offers either low or high commission rates. The optimal level of fake views is influenced by the content value distinct between creators, consumers’ multi-homing costs, and the platform’s commissions. Fake views incentivize the platform to raise advertising price. When the commission level is low, the platform tends to attract more advertisements. Interestingly, fake views can increase the profits of no brushing creators under high commission and boost the platform’s profit under low commission rates. Moreover, under moderate commissions, fake views can enhance consumer surplus. These findings offer theoretical insights for platforms in managing fake views and optimizing their advertising strategies. |
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