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新进制造商定价时机与在位者应对策略选择
Pricing timing decisions of entrant manufacturers and response \\strategies of incumbent manufacturers
摘要点击 54  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-05-14  修订日期:2025-11-13
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中文关键词  市场进入; 延时定价策略; 竞争应对策略; 消费者价格预期
英文关键词  market entry; delayed pricing strategy; competitive response strategy; consumer price expectation
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目(72274132);国家社会科学基金重大招标资助项目(21ZDA013);四川省哲学社会科学基金重大专项资助项目(SCJJ24ZD19)
投稿方向  供应链管理
作者单位邮编
张兆琪 四川大学商学院 610065
梁学栋 四川大学商学院 
晁祥瑞* 四川大学商学院 610065
中文摘要
      新进制造商在进入市场时, 可基于产品性能与定价时机差异选择即时定价或延时定价策略. 延时定价虽能通过激发消费者讨论获取更多反馈, 但也可能因价格预期偏差而抑制需求. 为此, 本研究构建了包含在位制造商、新进制造商和消费者的多阶段动态博弈模型, 探讨新进制造商在两种定价策略间的权衡及其与在位制造商互动对市场的影响. 研究发现: 对于新进制造商而言, 延时定价并非总是最优选择; 对于在位制造商而言, 无论新进制造商策略如何, 产品升级策略相较价格调整策略更能带来更高利润. 且在某些情况下, 尽管升级需投入更多成本, 但降价反而能增强竞争力. 进一步分析表明, 即使存在激烈价格竞争, 双方仍可能实现双赢局面.
英文摘要
      When entering the market, entrant manufacturers can choose between immediate pricing and delayed pricing strategies based on product performance and pricing timing. While delayed pricing allows them to stimulate consumer discussion and gather more market feedback, it may also suppress demand if actual prices deviate from consumer expectations. To analyze this trade-off between the two pricing strategies and the market impact of its interactions with the incumbent manufacturer, this paper develops a multi-stage dynamic game model involving an incumbent manufacturer, an entrant manufacturer, and consumers. The results show that delayed pricing is not always the optimal choice for entrant manufacturers. For incumbent manufacturers, regardless of the entrant's strategy, product upgrading yields higher profits than price adjustments. In some cases, although upgrading requires higher cost investment, lowering prices may actually enhance competitiveness. Further analysis indicates that even under fierce price competition, both manufacturers may still achieve a win–win outcome.
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