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考虑灰色市场与合同观测性的定价决策
Pricing Decisions Considering Gray Markets and Contract Observability
摘要点击 44  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-04-15  修订日期:2026-04-09
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中文关键词  统一批发价; 差异化批发价; 灰色市场; 合同不可观测; 博弈论
英文关键词  Uniform wholesale; Wholesale price discrimination; Gray Market; Contract unobservability; Game theory
基金项目  国家自然科学基金项目(72171235, 72101271, 72272153);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(20YJC630060)
投稿方向  供应链管理
作者单位邮编
李海 中南大学商学院 410000
姜巧琳 中南大学商学院 
曹裕* 中南大学商学院 410000
中文摘要
      灰色市场的潜在威胁对跨区域销售和供应链管理造成了显著的挑战, 加剧了品牌制造商合约设计与定价策略选择的复杂性. 利用博弈建模, 本文探讨了在批发价格合同不可观测且存在灰色市场威胁时, 制造商的合约设计与最优定价策略. 研究表明: 在合同可观测的情境下, 灰色市场的入侵促使制造商缩小两个市场之间的批发价格差距; 而在合同不可观测的情境下, 若制造商未承诺采取统一批发价策略, 制造商可能进一步扩大两个市场的批发价差以刺激灰色市场活动. 其次, 尽管在不存在灰色市场或合同可观测的灰色市场环境下, 差异化批发价格通常被认为是制造商的最优定价策略, 但当合同不可观测且灰色市场影响显著时, 统一批发价格可能在遏制灰色市场干扰方面发挥更大作用, 进而成为制造商更优的策略选择. 最后, 在合同不可观测情境下, 制造商可有效利用灰色市场带来的需求扩张, 推动供应链整体利润的提升.
英文摘要
      The potential threat of gray markets poses significant challenges to cross-regional sales and supply chain management, heightening the complexity of contract design and pricing strategy formulation for brand manufacturers. Using a game-theoretic model, this paper examines manufacturers' contract design and optimal pricing strategies under the dual constraints of unobservable wholesale price contracts and gray market threats. The results reveal that: in contractually observable scenarios, gray market intrusion induces manufacturers to narrow the wholesale price gap between two markets. Conversely, under unobservable contracts, manufacturers may further widen this gap to stimulate gray market activities if they refrain from committing to a uniform wholesale price strategy. Moreover, although differentiated wholesale pricing is generally optimal for manufacturers in contexts without gray markets or with observable contracts in gray market settings, uniform pricing emerges as a superior strategic choice when contracts are unobservable and gray market impacts are significant, given its greater efficacy in curbing gray market disruptions. Finally, when contracts are unobservable, manufacturers can proactively leverage the demand expansion induced by gray markets to enhance overall supply chain profitability.
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