| 不完美信号下电商企业差异化定价与退款策略设计 |
| Differentiated pricing and refund policies of retailers under imperfect signal |
| 摘要点击 26 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2025-02-28 修订日期：2026-03-16 |
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| 中文关键词 差异化定价；退款策略；不完美信号; 消费者估值不确定性；信息提供 |
| 英文关键词 differentiated pricing; refund policy; imperfect signals; consumer valuation uncertainty; information provision |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金面上项目,国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 投稿方向 供应链运营管理、博弈论 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 李婷婷 | 东北财经大学 | 116000 | | 史法通 | 东北财经大学 | | | 宋亚楠* | 北京科技大学 | 100000 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 线上购物中, 消费者在购买产品前往往具有估值不确定性, 从而在买后可能选择退货. 为降低消费者不确定性, 电商企业提供不同程度的产品信息, 向消费者发送关于其估值的不完美信号, 并据此设计差异化价格—退款策略. 本文研究一个垄断电商企业如何基于所传递的不完美信号制定最优价格—退款策略. 结果表明, 当消费者的估值异质性适中或较高且电商企业的退货损失较低时, 电商企业实施“低价—不退款”和“高价—全额退款”的购买选项. 否则, 电商企业实施统一的价格—退款策略且不允许消费者退货. 此外, 本文考察了电商企业是否有动机提供更丰富的产品信息以提高信号质量. 结果表明当且仅当消费者估值异质性较高且电商企业的退货损失较高时, 电商企业有动机提高信号质量. |
| 英文摘要 |
| In online shopping, consumers often exhibit valuation uncertainty prior to purchase, which may lead to returns after receiving the products. To mitigate such uncertainty, online retailers often provide varying levels of product information that convey imperfect signals about consumers' valuations, and design differentiated price-refund strategies accordingly. This study examines how a monopolistic online retailer designs its optimal price-refund strategy based on imperfect signals of consumer valuations. The results show that when consumer valuation heterogeneity is moderate or high and the return-handling cost of the online retailer is low, the retailer offers two options: a low price-no refund and a high price-full refund. Otherwise, the retailer adopts a uniform price-refund strategy that does not allow returns. In addition, this study examines whether the retailer has an incentive to provide more product information to enhance signal quality. The results indicate that the retailer has such an incentive if and only if consumer valuation heterogeneity and the return-handling cost of the retailer are both high. |
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