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平台混合销售模式下的信息获取和质量提升策略研究
Information acquisition and quality improvement strategies under platform hybrid sales mode
摘要点击 12  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2025-02-21  修订日期:2025-07-22
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中文关键词  供应链;混合模式;信息获取;质量提升;Stackelberg博弈
英文关键词  Supply chain; Hybrid mode;Information acquisition; Quality improvement; Stackelberg game
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171185);湖北省教育厅人文社会科学资助项目(21Y107);湖北省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地-企业决策支持研究中心资助项目(DSS20220601)
投稿方向  
作者单位邮编
余牛 武汉纺织大学管理学院 430073
鲍运韬* 武汉纺织大学管理学院 430073
李紫君 武汉纺织大学管理学院 
中文摘要
      考虑由制造商和平台零售商组成的二级供应链, 线上消费者可以通过混合渠道销售模式(转售+代售)购买产品, 研究平台零售商信息获取与制造商质量提升之间的战略互动. 基于信息获取时机的不同, 比较了承诺获取和条件获取两种策略. 研究表明: 平台零售商的两种信息获取策略均能促进制造商提升产品质量水平. 当信息获取成本较低时,平台零售商会倾向于采用承诺获取信息以激励制造商提升质量. 而当成本较高时,制造商和平台零售商的均衡利润均在条件获取策略下更高. 进一步的算例分析发现, 制造商利润随平台零售商的佣金率单调递减, 而平台零售商的利润大小受佣金率和渠道认知差异共同影响.
英文摘要
      Consider a two-echelon supply chain composed of manufacturers and platform retailers, where online consumers can purchase products through a hybrid channel sales model (reselling + agency selling). This study investigates the strategic interaction between platform retailer's information acquisition and manufacturer's quality improvement. Based on different timings of information acquisition, we compare two strategies: committed acquisition and conditional acquisition. The research demonstrates that both strategies of the platform retailer can incentivize the manufacturer to enhance product quality. When information acquisition costs are low, the platform retailer tends to adopt committed acquisition to motivate quality improvement. However, when costs are high, both the manufacturer's and platform retailer's equilibrium profits become higher under the conditional acquisition strategy. Further numerical analysis reveals that the manufacturer's profit decreases monotonically with the platform retailer's commission rate, while the platform retailer's profit is influenced by both commission rate and channel perception differences.
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