| 供应商入侵行为下的环境政策选择: 碳税与补贴的供应链效应比较 |
| Environmental Policy Choices Under Supplier Encroachment: Comparison of supply chain effects between carbon tax and subsidies |
| 摘要点击 46 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2025-01-26 修订日期：2025-12-02 |
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| 中文关键词 供应商入侵; 环境政策; 社会福利; 供应链管理; 零售商竞争 |
| 英文关键词 Supplier encroachment; environmental policy; social welfare; supply chain management; retailer competition |
| 基金项目 |
| 投稿方向 供应链入侵 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 张书华* | 天津财经大学 | 300222 | | 梁慧 | 天津财经大学 | | | 王新宇 | 天津财经大学 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 聚焦于补贴与碳税政策背景下供应商入侵行为对供应链及社会福利的影响, 借助博弈论模型深入研究. 主要结论如下: 不同政策下供应商入侵均能提升自身收益, 在特定条件下增进社会福利. 无环境政策时, 产品环境负面影响显著且零售商数量多; 补贴政策下, 产品环境损害严重但减排成本低; 碳税政策下, 供应商通过减排活动可提升社会福利. 此外, 当供应商产品环境损害小且减排成本高时, 碳税政策比补贴政策更利于鼓励入侵; 若产品环境损害大且减排成本高, 碳税政策在入侵情况下更能提升社会福利. 碳税政策下, 减排成本增加使供应商入侵收益先降后升, 而环境损害程度持续抑制收益提升; 减排成本和环境损害程度增加使社会福利提升幅度先降后升. |
| 英文摘要 |
| This study examines the impact of suppliers' encroachment on supply chains and social welfare under subsidy and carbon tax policies using game theory models. The research finds that suppliers' encroachment can increase their profits in all policy scenarios. Under carbon tax policies, encroachment enhances social welfare through emission reduction activities, especially when environmental damage is low and reduction costs are high. In contrast, subsidies encourage encroachment when environmental damage is severe but reduction costs are low. Results show that increasing reduction costs initially decrease and then increase encroachment profits, while environmental damage continuously suppresses profit growth. The study concludes that carbon tax policies are more effective in promoting sustainable supply chain management and social welfare improvement under certain conditions. |
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