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二手产品零售商回收品再售与质量信息披露策略
Resale and quality information disclosure strategies of the secondhand retailer
摘要点击 40  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2024-12-30  修订日期:2026-01-10
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中文关键词  二手产品; 再售; 质量信息披露
英文关键词  secondhand products; resale; quality information disclosure
基金项目  河南省软科学研究计划资助项目(252400411150); 国家资助博士后研究人员资助项目(GZC20240390); 中国博士后科学基金第75批面上资助项目(2024M750787); 河南省高校人文社会科学研究一般资助项目(2026-ZZJH-013); 河南省社科联2025年度调研课题资助项目(SKL-2025-1976)
投稿方向  物流与供应链
作者单位邮编
窦晓乐 黄河水利职业技术学院 610031
李增禄* 河南大学 475004
姚 远 河南大学 
中文摘要
      本研究分析了二手产品零售商的和回收品再售与质量信息披露策略选择问题. 考虑垄断环境和存在新产品零售商的竞争环境, 运用静态博弈和非线性规划理论构建决策模型并得到均衡结果, 通过均衡结果分析二手产品零售商的最优再售策略和质量信息披露策略. 研究发现: 随着二手产品感知质量的提高, 消费者需求增加, 再售策略由部分再售转变为全部再售. 垄断环境下, 无论质量高低二手产品零售商始终选择披露策略. 竞争环境下, 二手产品质量信息披露策略受到新产品批发价格和回收品转移价格的影响. 当批发价格较低时, 随着转移价格的提高, 二手产品质量信息披露策略依次为披露——隐瞒高质量——披露; 当批发价格适中时, 随着转移价格的提高, 二手产品质量信息披露策略依次为披露——隐瞒高质量; 当批发价格较高时, 二手产品零售商选择披露策略.
英文摘要
      Secondhand retailer’s resale and quality information disclosure strategies are investigated. Using the static game and nonlinear programming theory, decision models are constructed under a monopolistic environment with only secondhand product retailer and a competitive environment with a new product retailer and a secondhand product retailer. The results show that: As the perceived quality of secondhand products increases, the demand for these products increases, thus the resale strategy changes from partial resale to all resale. Under the monopolistic environment, the secondhand product retailer chooses quality information disclosure strategy regardless of the product quality. Under the competitive environment, the quality disclosure strategy is influenced by the wholesale price of new products and the transfer price of recycled products. When the wholesale price is low, as the transfer price increases, quality disclosure strategies are disclosure, concealing high-quality and disclosure. When the wholesale price is moderate, as the transfer price increases, quality disclosure strategies are disclosure and concealing high-quality. When the wholesale price is high, quality disclosure strategy is adopted.
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