| 新应急管理体制下跨部门协同治理的分析 |
| Analysis of interdepartmental collaborative governance in China's emergency management reform |
| 摘要点击 71 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2024-11-15 修订日期：2025-10-20 |
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| 中文关键词 跨部门协同治理；应急管理；扎根分析；演化机制 |
| 英文关键词 interdepartmental collaborative governance; emergency management; grounded theory; evolutionary game |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金青年项目；教育部人文社科基金青年项目 |
| 投稿方向 应急管理 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 孙典 | 北京交通大学 | 100044 | | 齐焱埼 | 北京交通大学 | | | 张路蓬* | 北京航空航天大学 | 100191 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 为了分析中国应急管理体制改革背景下的跨部门协同治理演化规律，基于实地调研与专家访谈数据，运用扎根理论方法识别关键作用要素，构建“利益-成本”分析框架，并采用演化博弈模型仿真其动态过程，研究发现：降低协同治理成本可显著增强应急管理部门协调能力，有效促进跨部门合作；应急管理部门与专业职能部门存在专业能力短板时，通过异质性资源重组可实现能力互补与效能提升；纵向行政约束下的严厉问责与高力度奖励机制均能促进跨部门合作.研究结果为优化应急协同治理机制提供了依据. |
| 英文摘要 |
| This study aims to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of interdepartmental collaborative governance within China's reformed emergency management system. We employ grounded theory analysis of field data and expert interviews to identify key influencing factors and construct a "benefit-cost analytical framework.
Subsequently, evolutionary game modeling is utilized to simulate the collaborative governance process. Key findings reveal: Lower collaboration costs significantly enhance the coordination effectiveness of emergency management departments; Resource integration between emergency management and specialized functional departments compensates for mutual professional capability gaps, fostering complementary advantages; Stringent vertical administrative controls, particularly incentive-aligned accountability mechanisms, effectively promote interdepartmental cooperation. These results provide insights for optimizing institutional design in emergency governance systems. |
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