| 消费者低碳偏好信息不对称下供应链决策及协调 |
| Supply chain decisions and coordination under asymmetric low-carbon preference information of consumers |
| 摘要点击 97 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2024-08-15 修订日期：2025-05-01 |
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| 中文关键词 供应链协调;单边碳减排成本分担契约;双边成本分担—收益共享契约;消费者低碳偏好 |
| 英文关键词 supply chain coordination; unilateral carbon abatement cost-sharing contract; bilateral cost-sharing-benefit-sharing contract; consumers’ low-carbon preference |
| 基金项目 |
| 投稿方向 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 杨玉香* | 中国计量大学 经济与管理学院 | 310018 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 考虑包含单个参与碳减排的制造商和单个具有消费者低碳偏好信息优势的零售商组成的供应链系统,分别构建信息是否共享的分散决策、集中决策、信息是否共享的单边碳减排成本分担和双边成本分担—收益共享契约七种博弈模型,研究零售商的信息共享策略,进一步针对不同的信息结构设计契约合同协调供应链。研究表明：(1)分散决策下的零售商是否自愿共享信息与制造商的碳减排效率水平相关；然而,信息共享始终有益于提高产品的单位碳减排量、订购量及制造商收益；(2)单边碳减排成本分担契约促使零售商采取更为保守的信息共享策略,并且信息共享不一定能提升产品的单位碳减排量和订购量,也不一定对制造商有利；(3)无论零售商是否共享信息,单边碳减排成本分担契约均有益于改善产品的单位碳减排量、订购量以及各方收益,但激励力度有限；而双边成本分担—收益共享契约仅在实现信息共享时能完美协调供应链,从而实现制造商、零售商与供应链整体的三赢局面。 |
| 英文摘要 |
| Build a supply chain (SC) system consisting of a single manufacturer involved in carbon emissions reductions (CER) and a single retailer with consumers’ low-carbon preference information advantages. Seven-game models of decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, unilateral carbon abatement cost-sharing, and bilateral cost-sharing-benefit-sharing contracts are constructed respectively for whether the information is shared or not, to study the retailer’s information sharing strategy and to design the contractual contract further to coordinate the SC according to the different information structures. The study shows that (1) whether retailers voluntarily share information under decentralized decision-making is related to the manufacturer’s carbon abatement efficiency. Still, information sharing is always beneficial in increasing the CER, the order quantity, and the manufacturer’s comprehensive revenue. (2) However, unilateral carbon abatement cost-sharing contracts make retailers more conservative in their information-sharing strategies, and the sharing behavior does not necessarily improve the unit CER and order quantities of products, nor is it necessarily beneficial to the manufacturer. (3) Regardless of whether retailers share information, unilateral carbon abatement cost-sharing contracts are beneficial to improving the unit CER and order quantities of products and the revenues of all parties, but the incentives are limited. The bilateral cost-sharing-benefit-sharing contracts are only beneficial in terms of information sharing. Bilateral cost-sharing-benefit-sharing pacts can only coordinate the SC perfectly if information is shared, and manufacturers, retailers, and the SC can achieve a win-win situation for all three parties. |
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