| 车企增建充电桩情形下的竞合策略 |
| Co-opetition for automakers with building extra charging stations |
| 摘要点击 7 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2024-06-09 修订日期：2025-04-02 |
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| 中文关键词 竞争；批发竞合；专利竞合；Nash谈判；充电桩 |
| 英文关键词 Competition; Wholesale co-opetition; License co-opetition; Nash bargaining; Charging Stations |
| 基金项目 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 冯中伟 | 河南理工大学工商管理学院 | 454000 | | 任宇航 | 河南理工大学工商管理学院 | | | 谭春桥* | 南京审计大学商学院 | 211815 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对由一个竞争性电池制造商和一个新能源汽车制造商组成的系统, 考虑两家车企增建充电桩的情形, 在竞争、批发竞合及专利竞合等三种模式下分别构建博弈模型并求得均衡解, 探讨竞争性电池制造商与新能源汽车制造商的竞合策略选择、充电桩增建决策. 研究表明: 受电池成本差异、议价能力、替代程度以及网络效率的影响, 竞争加剧不一定导致相互竞争的车企进行价格战. 竞合策略对于竞争性电池制造商与新能源汽车制造商的整车价格以及增建充电桩数量的影响主要取决于议价能力与电池成本差异. 替代程度、议价能力以及充电桩的网络效率能够影响最优策略的选择; 竞合是否实现帕累托改进受电池成本差异的影响. 与竞争情形相比, 当竞合实现帕累托改进时, 整车价格降低, 竞争性电池制造商增建的充电桩数量减少, 新能源汽车制造商增建的充电桩数量增加. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Considering a system with a competitive battery manufacturer (CBM) and a new energy vehicle manufacturer (NEM), where they built extra charging stations. Three models (i.e., competition, wholesaling co-opetition, and license co-opetition) were investigated. After deriving equilibria this paper investigated the decisions of building extra charging stations and cooperation strategy selection. The results show that intensified competition is not always to result in price wars due to the impacts of battery cost difference, bargaining power, substitution degree, and network efficiency. The influence of co-opetition on number for building extra charging stations depends on bargaining power and battery cost difference. The optimal strategy selection depends on substitution degree, bargaining power, and network efficiency, while battery cost difference affects Pareto improvement. Compared to competition, if co-opetition achieves Pareto improvement, the CBM (or NEM) decreases (or increases) number of building extra charging stations besides reducing vehicle price. |
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