| 不同质量策略下UGC媒体平台虚假 操作行为研究 |
| Research on False Operation Behavior of UGC Media Platform under Different Quality Strategies |
| 摘要点击 18 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2024-02-21 修订日期：2025-04-14 |
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| 中文关键词 质量策略；虚假操作；非线性收入分成；UGC媒体平台 |
| 英文关键词 Quality strategy; False operation; Nonlinear income sharing; UGC Media Platform |
| 基金项目 国家社会科学基金后期资助重点项目(23FGLA007) |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 本文针对不同质量类型的内容创作者与消费者存在匹配差异问题研究UGC媒体平台虚假操作行为，构建了一个由UGC媒体平台、内容创作者和消费者组成的Stackelberg博弈模型，分析了基础策略、补贴策略以及第一方供应策略三种质量策略下平台通过非线性收入分成方式有偿或线性收入分成方式无偿进行虚假操作时的最优定价决策以及平台选择虚假操作行为的动机.研究表明：当平台有偿采取虚假操作行为时，如果高质量内容创作者匹配程度远高于低质量内容创作者，任何质量策略下平台都没有进行虚假操作的动机；当两种类型内容创作者的匹配程度差异较小时，只有当佣金系数取值较大时，三种质量策略下平台才有可能进行虚假操作，基础策略与补贴策略下平台进行虚假操作的动机相同，且补贴策略总是优于基础策略；当平台采取虚假操作行为无法获得一定报酬时，补贴策略与第一方供应策略下平台均不会采取虚假操作行为. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Considering the issue of matching differences between consumers and content creators of different quality types, a Stackelberg game model consisting of an UGC media platform, content creators, and consumers was constructed to discuss the optimal pricing decision and the motivation for platform to choose false operation behavior under three quality strategies: basic strategy, subsidy strategy and first party supply strategy, when the platform engaged in false operation through non-linear income sharing with compensation or linear income sharing without compensation.
when platform engages in false operation behavior for a fee, if the matching degree of high-quality content creators is much higher than that of low-quality content creators, the platform has no motivation to engage in false operation under any quality strategy; When the difference in matching degree between the two types of content creators is small, only when the commission coefficient value is large, the platform under the three quality strategi |
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