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供应商自主品牌产品的质量战略决策
Decisions of quality strategy of supplier private-label products
摘要点击 19  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2024-01-03  修订日期:2025-04-14
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中文关键词  供应链管理; 外包; 产品质量; 渠道
英文关键词  supply chain management; outsource; product quality; channel
基金项目  国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)
作者单位邮编
冯雨婷 合肥工业大学 230009
陈增明 潍柴控股集团有限公司 
陈敬贤 合肥工业大学 
梁昌勇* 合肥工业大学 230009
中文摘要
      制造业供应链的部件和/或代工供应商可能通过提出自主品牌产品侵入下游客户制造商的市场并与其竞争.相比较制造商的产品而言, 一般供应商的自主品牌产品更加劣质, 而潍柴的实践表明, 供应商的自主品牌产品可能较客户制造产品更加优质. 基于此, 本文考虑包含一个供应商和一个制造商的二级供应链, 供应商为制造商提供产品或零部件代工服务. 另外, 供应商可能开发自主品牌产品侵入其客户制造商的市场. 给定制造商的产品可能是优质或劣质产品, 本文建立了制造商和供应商分别作为领导者和跟随者的Stackelberg博弈. 通过对子博弈精炼均衡解的分析研究了供应商的自主品牌产品的战略决策, 也即选择优质还是劣质产品侵入市场. 研究结果表明,供应商选择优质产品侵入市场可能成为供应商和制造商的双赢战略.
英文摘要
      Manufacturing supply chains indicate that component suppliers and/or contract manufacturers may encroach on the market of downstream customer manufacturers and compete with them by launching their own brand products. Generally speaking, the self-branded products of suppliers are inferior to those of manufacturers. However, the practice of Weichai shows that the self-branded products of suppliers may be superior to those of customers. Thus, this paper considers a supply chain consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, wherein the supplier supplies products or core components to the manufacturer. In addition, the supplier may develop her own branded product to encroach on the market of their customer manufacturer. Given that the manufacturer’s product is either high- or low-quality, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer and the supplier act the leader and the follower, respectively. Analyzing the subgame refined Nash equilibria (SPEs), we investigate whether the supplier chooses the high-quality product or the low-quality product to encroach on the market. Our results demonstrate that, using high-quality products to encroach may realize win-win outcomes for both the manufacturer and the supplier.
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