| 限制联盟下供应链价格竞争与回收合作 |
| Price competition and recycling cooperation for supply chain with restricted coalitions |
| 摘要点击 71 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2023-12-01 修订日期：2024-06-04 |
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| 中文关键词 再制造补贴；限制联盟；Position值；非合作-合作两型博弈；环境影响 |
| 英文关键词 remanufacturing subsidy; restricted coalitions; Position value; noncooperative-cooperative biform game; environmental impact |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 魏骊晓 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | 611731 | | 李登峰 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | 611731 | | 李梦祺 | 电子科技大学经济与管理学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 政府实施补贴政策下，研究政府的再制造补贴、制造商间的价格竞争策略及制造商与回收商回收废旧产品的合作方案。在销售价格竞争的环境下，考虑制造商间不能任意结盟的现实情况，分析制造商与回收商的可能结盟方式及联盟利润创造过程，建立具有限制联盟结构的非合作-合作两型博弈模型。基于边（制造商与回收商之间连接关系）在合作中的贡献，给出具有限制联盟结构的非合作-合作两型博弈的解法。研究结果表明，制造商与回收商合作回收废旧产品有利于提高回收率，创造更多利润；把政府再制造补贴作为内生变量，能够得到最优再制造补贴决策，可为政府精准实施补贴政策提供理论依据；适度提高市场竞争程度能够提高新产品的销售价格和需求、废旧产品的回收率；制造商应积极改进再制造技术，提高使用废旧产品再制造的成本优势，增强企业竞争力。 |
| 英文摘要 |
| Under the government’s subsidy policy, this paper studies the remanufacturing subsidy, price competition strategies, and the cooperative contract for collecting used products. In any competitive environment, considering that manufacturers cannot form arbitrary coalitions, a noncooperative -cooperative biform game model with restricted coalitions is established by analyzing coalitions and profit creation. Based on the contribution of edge in cooperation, the solution method is given. The results show that the cooperation between the manufacturer and recycler to collect used products can improve the collection rate and create more profits. Taking the government’s remanufacturing subsidy as an endogenous variable to obtain the optimal subsidy decision, provides a theoretical basis for the government to implement the subsidy policy accurately. Strengthening market competition can increase the sales price, demand for new products, and collection rate. Manufacturers should actively improve remanufacturing technology and increase the cost advantage of remanufacturing to enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. |
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