| ESG激励与管理者激励及契约实现 |
| ESG Incentives and Manager Incentives with Contract Implementation |
| 摘要点击 24 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2023-11-03 修订日期：2024-10-18 |
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| 中文关键词 ESG，税收激励，契约设计，外部性，契约实现 |
| 英文关键词 ESG, Tax incentives, Contract design, Externalities, Contract implementation |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 张雨骞 | 南方科技大学 | 518055 | | 杨招军 | 南方科技大学 | 518055 | | 谈丽华 | 南方科技大学 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 为探究ESG背景下的激励问题, 构建了一个新颖的连续时间三方博弈模型. 风险中性的委托人(投资者)雇佣风险厌恶的代理人(企业家)来管理企业(项目), 政府决策者通过税收政策激励企业家主动履行ESG责任. 代理人可以通过选择有成本的ESG绩效来影响项目运营造成的负外部性和项目收入. 通过契约理论中的鞅方法得到了企业内部的契约激励关系、政府决策者应该实施的最优税收激励政策、最优税率的解析计算公式. 同时, 给出了最优契约的证券实现、应用举例和比较静态分析. 结果表明: 税收激励政策通过改变契约对代理人的激励因子覆盖ESG成本, 进而将激励传导至代理人, 使其提高ESG责任. 合理的税收激励政策能够实现帕累托改进. 非线性成本等扩展模型表明结论具有稳健性. |
| 英文摘要 |
| To explore incentive issues under the context of ESG, this paper constructs a novel continuous-time tripartite game model. Risk-neutral principals (investors) hire risk-averse agents (entrepreneurs) to manage enterprises (projects), while government decision-makers incentivize entrepreneurs to proactively fulfill ESG responsibilities through tax policies. Agents can influence the negative externalities and project cash flow by choosing cost-incurred ESG performance. Through martingale methods in contract theory, the internal contractual incentive relationship within the enterprise, the optimal tax incentive policy that government decision-makers should implement, and the analytical formula for computing the optimal tax rate are obtained. Meanwhile, the realization of optimal contracts for securities, application examples, and comparative static analysis are provided. The results indicate that tax incentive policies cover ESG costs by altering the incentive factors of agents in contracts, thereby transmitting incentives to agents to enhance ESG responsibilities. Reasonable tax incentive policies can achieve Pareto improvement. Extension models such as nonlinear costs demonstrate the robustness of the conclusions. |
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