| 信息不对称下企业投资时机信号传递模型 |
| Signaling model of firm investment timing under information asymmetry |
| 摘要点击 73 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2023-10-16 修订日期：2024-07-14 |
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| 中文关键词 信息不对称; 投资时机; 信号传递; 资产支持证券 |
| 英文关键词 information asymmetry; investment timing; signaling; asset-backed securities |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目）； |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 张勇 | 吉首大学数学与统计学院 | 416000 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 从信息不对称视角, 研究企业类型数量对企业投融资决策的影响. 采用信号传递理论, 建立多企业动态博弈模型, 给出企业应用投资时机传递类型信号的单交差条件和最小潜力差分离均衡条件, 考察企业资产证券化融资的产品价值. 研究表明, 多企业分离均衡是一个多阶段的分离过程, 企业越先分离表明企业增长潜力越高; 多企业既要满足单交差条件, 还要企业间的增长潜力差均满足对应的最小潜力差分离均衡条件, 这样投资时机才是传递企业真实类型的可靠信号, 该信号有利于提高多资产支持的证券化产品总价值; 企业类型数量的增加会提高分离均衡的难度, 增加高潜力企业的逆向选择成本. |
| 英文摘要 |
| This paper develops a dynamic game model, having multiple types of firms, for the firm to signal its type through optimal investment timing of the risky project. The paper studies the influence of the number of firm types on the investment and financing decision under information asymmetry. The results show that separating equilibrium of multi-firm is a multi-stage separation process, in which the higher the growth potential of the firm is the first to separate. When the firm meets single-crossing condition and least growth potential difference condition, the investment timing is a reliable signal, which can help firm to filter assets and improve returns on securitization production. Increasing the number of firm types could increase the difficulty of separating equilibrium, and increase the adverse selection cost of high potential firm. |
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