| 水产养殖气象指数保险市场演化博弈分析 |
| Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of the Aquaculture Meteorological Index Insurance Market |
| 摘要点击 85 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2023-09-28 修订日期：2025-07-23 |
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| 中文关键词 水产养殖; 气象指数保险; 失望规避; 演化博弈 |
| 英文关键词 aquaculture; weather index insurance; disappointment avoidance; evolutionary game; |
| 基金项目 |
| 投稿方向 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 丁黎黎 | 中国海洋大学 | 266100 | | 侯雅姝 | 中国海洋大学 | | | 张凯旋* | 中国海洋大学 | 26100 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 为探究水产养殖气象指数保险参与主体间的行为交互关系, 构建了包含渔民、保险公司和政府的三方演化博弈模型, 引入渔民情绪收益函数, 研究了三方在水产养殖气象指数保险市场的决策行为演化规律. 结果表明: 失望感知情绪能够提升渔民投保意愿; 政府补贴具有促进作用, 但需要维持在适度范围内; 保险费率降低有助于提高指数保险产品需求, 需求上升带动供给增加; 不过, 研发成本以及溢出效应的增加不利于指数保险市场的发展. 研究结论可在政府决策制定和情绪引导角度促进水产养殖气象指数保险市场发展. |
| 英文摘要 |
| To explore the behavioral interactions among participating subjects of aquaculture weather index insurance, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model including fishermen, insurance companies, and the government. By introducing the fishermen's emotional benefit function, the intrinsic driving mechanism of fishermen's disappointment aversion to the development of aquaculture weather index insurance market is further explored. The results show that the disappointment perception parameter can increase fishermen's willingness to insure. The government subsidy has a promoting effect, but should be maintained within a moderate range. Lower insurance rates help increase demand for index insurance products, which will increase the supply. However, the increase in R&D costs and spillover effects are not conducive to the development of the index insurance market. The conclusion of this study can promote the development of aquaculture meteorological index insurance market from the perspective of government decision-making and emotional guidance. |
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