| 批发商投机与运营商监管的农批市场演化博弈 |
| Evolutionary game between wholesaler speculation and operator supervision in produce wholesale market |
| 摘要点击 23 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2023-05-11 修订日期：2024-07-21 |
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| 中文关键词 农批市场; 投机行为; 监管策略; 演化博弈; 公益性 |
| 英文关键词 produce wholesale market; speculative behavior; supervision strategy; evolutionary game; public welfare |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金资助项目；国家社会科学基金资助项目；重庆市研究生科研创新项目 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 但斌 | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 | 400044 | | 钟琴 | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 | | | 雷婷 | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 | | | 陈振江 | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对农批市场中运营商对批发商采取的以次充好投机行为进行监管的问题, 考虑投机行为对消费者福利和运营商效用的影响, 通过构建批发商和运营商的演化博弈模型, 研究了农批市场系统演化博弈的均衡状态及稳定策略. 研究表明: 运营商采取严格监管策略能够有效约束批发商的投机行为并保障消费者福利; 当运营商公益系数较高时, 在一定条件下, 严格监管提升的消费者福利将占优于佣金损失和监管成本对运营商带来的利润损失, 运营商趋于采取严格监管策略; 而当运营商公益系数较低时, 潜在的佣金损失致使运营商趋于采取宽松监管策略, 可能导致农批市场"劣币驱逐良币"的不良生态并损害消费者福利, 政府部门加强监督能够缓解上述不利影响. |
| 英文摘要 |
| To solve the problem of operator supervising the speculative behavior of wholesalers in the produce wholesale market, considering the impact of speculative behavior on consumer welfare and operator utility, this paper studied the evolutionary game equilibrium state and stability strategy of the produce wholesale market by constructing the evolutionary game model. The research shows that operator can effectively restrain the speculative behavior of wholesalers and protect consumer welfare by adopting strict supervision strategy; When the public welfare coefficient is high, under certain conditions, the consumer welfare improved by strict supervision will be larger than the profit loss of operator caused by commission loss and supervision cost, and operator tends to adopt strict supervision strategy; When the public welfare coefficient is low, the potential commission loss causes the operator to tend to adopt loose supervision strategy, which may lead to the bad ecology of "bad money drives out good" and damage the consumer welfare. Strengthening supervision by government can alleviate the above adverse effects. |
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