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考虑知识滥用的供应商选择研究
Supplier selection considering knowledge misappropriation
摘要点击 276  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2020-07-30  修订日期:2021-07-26
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中文关键词  知识滥用; 供应商; 契约; 制造外包
英文关键词  knowledge misappropriation; supplier; contract; manufacturing outsourcing
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目;广东省教育厅青年创新人才类资助项目
作者单位邮编
陈果 广东财经大学 510320
李柏勋 广东财经大学 
钟轶君* 浙江理工大学 310000
中文摘要
      针对供应商滥用知识时, 企业的供应商选择问题, 构建了考虑供应商知识滥用的外包博弈模型, 分析了当一个非竞争性供应商、一个竞争性供应商提供批发价格契约或两部定价契约时企业的供应商选择策略, 并探讨了供应商的契约选择策略, 以及知识滥用对上述策略的影响. 研究表明: 企业应根据两类供应商的契约、契约参数与受知识滥用能力影响的参数阈值的关系、知识滥用能力与能力阈值的关系选择供应商; 供应商的契约偏好与其索要的固定费用、受知识滥用能力影响的固定费用阈值有关; 供应商应综合企业的供应商选择策略、其他供应商的契约、自身的契约偏好选择契约类型.
英文摘要
      This paper analyzes the enterprise’s supplier selection strategy when suppliers misappropriate knowledge. By developing an outsourcing game model considering the supplier’s knowledge misappropriation, the enterprise’s supplier selection strategy is found when a non-competitive supplier and a competitive supplier respectively provides a wholesale price contract or a two-tariff contract. Moreover, suppliers’ contract selection strategies, and the influences of knowledge misappropriation on all strategies are discussed. The results show that the enterprise should consider two suppliers' contracts, the relationship between contracts parameters and parameters thresholds affected by knowledge misappropriation capacities, the relationship between knowledge misappropriation capacities and capacities thresholds when choosing the supplier; the supplier's contract preference is related to the fixed cost demanded by itself and cost threshold affected by knowledge misappropriation capacity; the supplier should consider the enterprise's supplier selection strategy, the other supplier's contract, contract preference when selecting the contract type.
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