| 回收商相互竞争下闭环供应链成员的竞合策略研究 |
| Members’ co-opetition strategy in closed-loop supply chains with competing recyclers |
| 摘要点击 297 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2020-07-28 修订日期：2021-08-31 |
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| 中文关键词 闭环供应链；回收商竞争；竞合博弈；定价策略 |
| 英文关键词 closed-loop supply chain; competing recyclers; co-opetition; pricing |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71802064)；广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2018A030313760,2016A030313535)；教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(15YJC630138)；广州市社科规划一般项目(2018GZYB123). |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 肖旦* | 广州大学 | 510006 | | 聂珊珊 | 广州大学 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 考虑由一个零售商、一个制造商和两个相互竞争的回收商所组成三层闭环供应链中成员的竞合博弈.根据制造商与其他闭环供应链成员的不同合作策略,针对分散化决策、制造商与零售商合作决策、制造商与单个回收商合作决策、制造商与两个回收商合作决策和集中化决策五种情形,对比分析闭环供应链成员在不同情形下的最优竞合策略.研究表明:产品中再制造品所占的比例提高,产品零售价格会升高,市场需求降低;使用过的产品的回收价格先升高后降低,回收数量先增加后减少.当回收商间竞争增强时也有类似的结论,不同的是,使用过的产品的回收数量会随着回收商间竞争的增强而不断减少.集中化决策下的使用过的产品的回收数量及供应链总利润最大. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Considering members’co-opetition game in a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) composed of one retailer, one manufacturer and two competing recyclers. According to the different alliance strategies of the manufacturer with other CLSC members, five models are constructed: decentralized, manufacturerretailer, manufacturer-one-recycler, manufacturer-two-recyclers and centralized models. Under different models, the optimal co-opetition decisions of members with comparative analysis. Our results show that, in each decision-making model, with increasing proportion of remanufactured goods in products, the retail price of products rises, but the demand declines, the recycling price and recycling quantity of products increases first and then decreases. The similar results we can obtain as intense competition among recyclers. Differently, recyclers’competition reduces the recycling quantity of used products. And, both the recycling quantity of used products and the total supply chain profits achieve the maximum in the centralized model. |
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