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考虑政府补贴及CSR投入的闭环供应链运作协调
Operation and coordination of closed-loop supply chain considering government’s subsidy and corporate social responsibility investment
摘要点击 314  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2020-07-28  修订日期:2021-07-26
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中文关键词  闭环供应链;企业社会责任;政府补贴;定价决策;协调契约
英文关键词  closed-loop supply chain;corporate social responsibility;government subsidy;pricing decision;coordination contract
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目(71701056);黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目(G2018007);黑龙江省普通高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(LGYC2018JC056)
作者单位邮编
姚锋敏* 哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院 150080
闫颍洛 哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院 
滕春贤 哈尔滨理工大学经济与管理学院 
中文摘要
      研究政府回收再制造补贴与主导零售商企业社会责任(CSR)投入交互影响下的闭环供应链运作协调问题。分别构建了有无政府补贴与CSR投入的闭环供应链决策模型,探讨了政府回收再制造补贴与零售商CSR投入间的交互影响以及两者对闭环供应链运作的影响,并分析了改进的CSR成本共担契约与两部定价契约对零售商CSR投入的激励效果以及协调的有效性。研究表明,政府回收再制造补贴不仅能增强制造商的废旧产品回收及再制造意识,也能促使零售商降低新产品零售价格、提高CSR投入水平。零售商CSR投入不利于降低新产品零售价格,但总是有利于提高政府补贴效率、改善闭环供应链绩效及成员间的合作关系。CSR成本共担契约与两部定价契约均能激励零售商提高CSR投入水平,但仅两部定价契约能完美实现闭环供应链的协调。
英文摘要
      This paper studies the operation and coordination of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) under the interaction of recycling and remanufacturing subsidy of government and corporate social responsibility (CSR) investment of dominant retailer. The optimization models of CLSC with or without government subsidy and CSR investment are constructed respectively, and the interaction between government’s recycling and remanufacturing subsidy and retailer’s CSR investment, as well as their influences on CLSC operation are investigated. Further, the incentive effect on retailer’s CSR investment and coordination effectiveness of improved CSR cost sharing contract and two-part tariffs contract are analyzed. It shows that the government’s recycling and remanufacturing subsidy can not only enhance the manufacturer’s awareness of recycling and remanufacturing of waste products, but also encourage the retailer to reduce the retail price of new products and increase the CSR investment level. The retailer’s CSR investment is adverse to reducing the retail price of new products, but it is always conducive to improving the efficiency of government subsidy and improving the CLSC performance and cooperative relationship between CLSC members. Both the CSR cost sharing contract and two-part tariffs contract can encourage the retailer to improve CSR investment level, but only the two-part tariffs contract can perfectly realize the coordination of CLSC.
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