| 基于激励削弱与惩罚遏制的零售商串谋约束研究 |
| Retailer collusion constraint based on incentive weakening and punishment containment |
| 摘要点击 424 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2020-06-09 修订日期：2021-11-13 |
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| 中文关键词 零售商串谋;激励契约;惩罚策略;买方势力 |
| 英文关键词 retailer’s collusion; incentive contract; punishment strategy; buyer power |
| 基金项目 福建省社科基地重大资助项目(FJ2020JDZ070);福建省创新战略研究计划资助项目（2021R0086）；教育部人文社科研究基金资助项目(19YJC630194) |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 吴赐联* | 福建江夏学院 会计学院 | 350008 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 考虑零售商串谋时的制造商渠道决策问题,基于Bertrand竞争市场，分析实体渠道和双渠道情形下，零售商串谋的市场条件和内生动力，以及串谋对供应链的影响,构建供应链惩罚协调契约模型,研究制造商对零售商串谋动机的激励削弱与惩罚遏制策略.研究表明:串谋时规模较小的零售商的利润将被实力雄厚的零售商吞噬，因此串谋并非零售商限制竞争的严格占优策略.架设直销渠道是制造商应对零售商串谋的有效方式,协调契约可作为规范零售商竞争行为的补充选择,但获得利润激励的零售商仍可能串谋,进而将惩罚因子作为内生变量嵌入协调契约中,通过渠道策略与激励惩罚双重机制遏制零售商串谋. |
| 英文摘要 |
| Considering the manufacturer channel decision problem under the retailers’ collusion behavior, based on the Bertrand competitive market, this paper analyzed the market conditions and endogenous motivation of retailers’ collusion in the physical channel and dual-channel situations, and the impact of the collusion on the supply chain. Constructed a supply chain punishment coordination contract model to study how manufacturers use incentive and punishment strategies to weaken retailers' motives for collusion. The research shows that when retailers collude, the profit of smaller retailers will be swallowed by powerful retailers, so collusion is not a strictly dominant strategy for retailers to limit competition. Setting up direct selling channel is an effective way for manufacturers to deal with retailers’ collusion, coordinating contract can be used as a supplementary choice to regulate retailers’ competitive behavior. However, retailers who obtain profit incentives may still collude. Furthermore, the punishment factor is embedded as an endogenous variable in the coordination contract, and the retailer collusion is restrained by the dual mechanism of channel strategy and incentive punishment. |
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