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碳标签制度下三级供应链定价与碳减排决策
The pricing and carbon emission reduction decisions in the three-echelon supply chain under the carbon labelling system
摘要点击 379  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2020-05-19  修订日期:2021-03-25
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中文关键词  供应链;碳标签;定价;碳减排;消费者环境意识
英文关键词  supply chain; carbon labelling; pricing;carbon emission reduction; consumer environmental awareness
基金项目  国家自然科学基金面上项目(71671001, 71672015);安徽省哲学社科规划(AHSKQ2018D09);安徽省高校自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2018A0101);安徽工程大学中青年拔尖人才培养计划(S022019008).
作者单位邮编
张云丰* 1 安徽工程大学 管理工程学院 241000
尚钱龙 1 安徽工程大学 管理工程学院 
龚本刚 1 安徽工程大学 管理工程学院 
王 勇 1 安徽工程大学 管理工程学院 
中文摘要
      考虑制造商的生产过程和运输商的运输过程均产生碳排放,研究由制造商、运输商及零售商组成的三级供应链在实施碳标签制度下的定价与碳减排决策问题.构建Stackberg博弈模型来分析供应链成员企业在无合作、单领域合作及双领域合作三种决策模式下的定价与碳减排最优策略组合,并讨论消费者环境意识水平对供应链定价与碳减排的影响.结果表明,双领域合作决策在经济效益(供应链系统利润)、社会效益(市场需求和产品定价)及环境效益(碳减排量)方面明显优于其它两种决策模式.为此,引入常相对风险规避型效用函数与Nash讨价还价理论来设计供应链协调契约,推导供应链成员企业参与协调的必要条件,合理分配双领域合作决策模式下的利润增量,实现三级供应链的完美协调.
英文摘要
      This paper considers that both the manufacturer's production process and the transporter's transport process produce carbon emissions. The article studies the pricing and carbon emission reduction decision-making of the three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a transporter and a retailer under the implementation of carbon labeling system. A Stackberg game model was established to analyze the optimal strategy combinations of pricing and carbon emission reduction of supply chain member enterprises under three modes of non-cooperation, single-domain cooperation and dual-domain cooperation. The paper discussed the impact of consumers' environmental awareness level on the pricing and carbon emission reduction of supply chain. The results show that the double-domain cooperative model is obviously superior to the other two models in terms of economic benefit (profit of supply chain system), social benefit (market demand and product pricing) and environmental benefit (carbon emission reduction). Therefore, the utility function of constant relative risk avoidance and Nash bargaining theory are introduced to design the coordination contract of supply chain. The necessary conditions for member enterprises to participate in the coordination are derived. The profit increment under the double-domain cooperation mode is reasonably distributed to realize the perfect coordination of three-echelon supply chain.
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