消费者定制能力异质下定制与标准化生产策略 |
Customized and standardized production strategies under heterogeneity of consumers' customizing capability |
摘要点击 201 全文点击 0 投稿时间:2020-03-30 修订日期:2021-03-04 |
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中文关键词 博弈模型; 竞争策略; 定制水平; 标准多样化; 退货政策 |
英文关键词 game model; competition strategy; customization level; standard diversification; return policy |
基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目,教育部人文社科规划项目 |
作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | 赵连霞* | 上海大学 | 200444 | 岳超楠 | 上海大学 | | 王芳晴 | 上海大学 | | 张小峰 | 上海大学 | | 温小琴 | 上海大学 | |
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中文摘要 |
本文探究了两企业的竞争策略, 其中一家企业通过丰富标准化产品种类吸引消费者, 而另一家企业则通过提高定制水平和提供退货政策吸引消费者参与定制. 基于消费者个人定制能力的异质性, 构建了两阶段双寡头博弈模型, 通过逆向归纳法得到了均衡解, 对企业的最优策略进行了比较,并给出了用于比较企业利润的指标. 结果表明, 两企业在市场竞争中均能盈利, 且定制产品的价格和利润不一定高于标准产品. 消费者参与定制的个人努力成本增加会使消费者剩余降低, 退货政策及消费者对产品多样化偏好增加则有助于消费者剩余的提升. |
英文摘要 |
This paper studies the competitive strategies of two firms in which one attracts consumers by enriching the variety of standard products, while the other attracts consumers to customize the products by improving customization level and providing return policy. Based on the heterogeneity of consumers' customizing capability, this paper constructs a two-stage duopoly game model, and obtains the equilibrium solutions by backward induction. Comparisons of optimal strategies between two firms are made, and the index for comparing the profits of the two firms is also presented. Results show that the price of customized product is not necessarily higher than that of standard product, and the two firms are always profitable in market competition. Furthermore, Consumer surplus decreases in personal effort cost of customization, and increases in return policy and consumer preference for product variety. |
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