| 供应商采取成本减少努力时垂直需求信息共享 |
| Vertical demand information sharing under suppliers with cost reduction efforts |
| 摘要点击 1332 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2018-01-26 修订日期：2018-09-01 |
| 查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 中文关键词 供应不确定；成本减少努力；需求信息共享；竞争 |
| 英文关键词 supply uncertainty; cost reduction effort; demand information sharing; competition |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 吴军建 | 南昌大学经济管理学院 | 330031 | | 王海燕 | 东南大学经济管理学院 | 210096 |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对由多个竞争供应商和两个竞争零售商构成的供应链,~供应商存在供应不确定,~零售商拥有需求信息,~供应商通过决策成本减少努力水平和批发价格来响应零售商需求信息.~建立了一个多阶段博弈模型研究零售商垂直需求信息共享问题.~结果表明,~当努力成本系数充分小时,~完全信息共享是一个均衡策略,~即两个零售商会免费地与供应商共享需求信息.~当努力成本系数充分大时,~两个零售商在向供应商收取一定的费用后会与供应商共享需求信息.~此外,~在一定条件下,~预测误差越小、努力成本系数越大、供应不确定程度越低、供应商数量越少、供应商的最优支付费用越多. |
| 英文摘要 |
| For a supply chain composed of multiple competitive suppliers and two competitive retailers, where suppliers have supply uncertainties and retailers have their own demand information. The suppliers set the cost reduction effort level and the wholesale price to respond to the retailers' demand information. A multi-stage game model is set to investigate retailers' vertical demand information sharing strategies. The results show that when the cost coefficient of effort is small enough, complete information sharing is an equilibrium strategy, that is, the two retailers are willing to share information with supplies for free. When cost coefficient of effort is large enough, the two retailers are willing to share information with suppliers after charging a fee. Moreover, under some condition, smaller forecast error, larger cost coefficient of effort, lower supply uncertainty and smaller number of suppliers increase suppliers' optimal payment. |
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