| 基于多任务委托代理的混合产品生成激励机制 |
| Incentive mechanism of hybrid offerings generation based on multi-task principle-agent model |
| 摘要点击 1783 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2018-01-22 修订日期：2019-03-08 |
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| 中文关键词 混合产品;服务衍生;多任务委托代理;激励机制;均衡策略 |
| 英文关键词 hybrid offerings;service derivative;multi-task principle-agent;incentive model;equilibrium strategy |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 罗建强 | 江苏大学 管理学院 | 212013 | | 陆淑娴 | 江苏大学 管理学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 实物产品与衍生服务有效匹配形成的混合产品能够实现供需双方的价值共创。针对混合产品生成过程中存在的委托代理关系，以产品制造与服务衍生两项任务为努力投入，借助Holmstrom-Milgrom激励理论构建了客户对制造企业的多任务委托代理模型，探究了供需双方决策的影响因素，并给出了制造企业努力均衡的策略。结果表明：客户最优激励系数及企业最优努力水平均与混合产品内部化边际收益正相关，与制造企业风险规避度、混合产品生成成本因子及任务成本相关性负相关；服务外部化边际收益及外部环境不确定性对客户两项任务的激励系数以及企业两项任务的努力水平均产生不同影响；混合产品的价值实现需要供需双方的共同努力以达到产品与服务的兼顾与均衡。 |
| 英文摘要 |
| Hybrid offerings matched by products and their derivative services can achieve value co-creation for manufacturer and customer. Aiming at customer-agent problem solving in the generation process of hybrid offerings, taking product manufacturing and service derivative as input, the multi-task principal-agent model of customer to manufacturer was constructed under Holmstrom-Milgrom theory, the influence factors of manufacturer's and customer's decisions were analyzed, and the efforts equilibrium strategies were given from the perspective of supply and demand. The results show: the optimal customer's incentive coefficients and the optimal efforts level of manufacturer are positively associated with the internalized marginal revenue of hybrid offerings, negatively associated with the risk attitude of manufacturers、cost factor of hybrid offerings generation and cost relevance of two tasks; the marginal benefit of service externalization and the environment uncertainties of two tasks have different effects on customer's incentive coefficients and manufacturer's efforts level of two tasks; the value realization of hybrid offerings needs the balance between products and services, as well as the joint efforts between supply and demand. |
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