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媒体曝光视角下环境污染邻避冲突多方演化博弈分析
Multi-evolutionary game analysis of NIMBY conflicts caused by environmental pollution from the perspective of media exposure
摘要点击 229  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2019-01-11  修订日期:2019-11-25
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中文关键词  环境污染;邻避冲突;媒体曝光;三方演化博弈;数值分析
英文关键词  environmental pollution; NIMBY conflict; media exposure; tripartite evolutionary game; mumerical analysis
基金项目  国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571149);四川省软科学研究计划资助项目( 2018ZR0333)
作者单位邮编
徐浩 西南交通大学经济管理学院 610031
谭德庆 西南交通大学经济管理学院 
中文摘要
      基于媒体对环境污染事件曝光的不确定性,探讨了邻避冲突中污染企业、周边群众与环境监管部门之间的行为策略选择问题,构建三方演化博弈模型并结合数值仿真,分析了各主体的演化稳定策略与影响策略选择的因素.研究表明,在媒体曝光概率较高的情况下,任何一方主体行为的演化趋势都与其他两方的策略选择密切相关;降低媒体曝光的交易成本、增加对污染企业违规排放的处罚并提高周边群众由于污染受到的补偿,同时上级政府加大对环境监管部门宽松监管时的惩罚力度是有效控制污染邻避冲突的关键.
英文摘要
      Based on the uncertainty of media exposure to environmental pollution events, the problem of behavioral strategies among pollution enterprise, surrounding people and environmental supervision department in NIMBY conflict is discussed. By establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model and numerical simulation, the evolutionary stability strategies of each participant are analyzed. The results show that the evolutionary trend of behaviors of any one of the participators is closely related to the strategies of other two participators; It has an important significance on controlling the pollution NIMBY conflicts to reduce the transaction cost of media exposure and increase the penalties for violation of polluting enterprise and improve compensation for surrounding people due to environmental pollution. At the same time, it is also significant for superior government to increase punishment for the negligence of supervision of environmental supervision department.
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