| 可转债与控制权私利下公司投资决策 |
| Convertible debt and firm investment decisions under private benefits of control |
| 摘要点击 153 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2018-12-20 修订日期：2019-12-31 |
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| 中文关键词 控制权私利;可转债;投资决策;代理冲突 |
| 英文关键词 private benefits of control; convertible debt; optimal investment decisions; agency conflicts |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金青年资助项目(71502054),湖南省自然科学基金(2016JJ3046)。 |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 宋丹丹 | 湖南大学 金融与统计学院 | 410079 | | 杨运慧 | 湖南大学 金融与统计学院 | | | 唐小林 | 湖南大学 金融与统计学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 本文探究可转债、控制权私利对公司投资决策和代理成本的影响. 通过建立实物期权模型, 基于均衡定价原理, 分析计算了投资期权价值、最优投资策略以及控股股东的代理成本. 研究结果表明, 相比普通债, 可转债能显著地提高控股股东的投资期权价值, 但同时降低公司价值. 控股股东倾向于利用可转债为公司融资, 但从社会福利角度公司更倾向于利用普通债融资. 同时, 可转债不仅有效地抑制了控股股东的过度投资行为, 而且显著地缓解了控股股东与中小投资者之间的代理冲突. |
| 英文摘要 |
| This paper explores the effects of convertible bond and private benefits of control on investment decisions and agency costs. By establishing real option model and based on equilibrium pricing principle, the value of investment option, optimal investment strategy and agency cost of controlling shareholders are analyzed and calculated. The results showed that compared with the straight debt, the convertible bond can significantly increase the controlling shareholders’ option value, but reduce the firm value simultaneously. The controlling shareholders tend to use the convertible debt financing, but the firm tends to use straight debt financing from the perspective of social welfare. In addition, the convertible bond not only effectively curbs the over-investment behavior of controlling shareholders, but also significantly eases the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and small and medium-sized investors. |
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