| 广告平台信息披露策略研究 |
| Information Disclosure Strategy of Advertising Platform |
| 摘要点击 1679 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2018-03-20 修订日期：2019-10-17 |
| 查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 中文关键词 广告平台；竞价策略；信息披露；信息型信号 |
| 英文关键词 Advertising platform; Bidding strategy; Information disclosure; Informative signal |
| 基金项目 国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目） |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 邹翔 | 东南大学经济管理学院 | 211189 | | 仲伟俊 | 东南大学经济管理学院 | 211189 | | 梅姝娥 | 东南大学经济管理学院 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 基于广告平台视角, 针对信息过度精准和市场过度细分导致的更少广告主参与竞拍、竞价降低、平台利润
减少等问题, 研究广告平台的信息披露策略及其对广告主竞价策略和平台收益的影响. 通过建立模型分析发现, 平
台提供有噪音的信息优于提供精准信息, 平台通过适度隐藏或模糊用户的相关信息来影响广告主的竞价行为, 能提
高平台收益. 当平台选择提供有噪音的信息时, 应根据条件选择最优信息精准度: 当用户偏好差异较大而广告主间
的价值差异较小时, 平台应选择较低的信息精准度; 但当用户偏好差异较小而广告主间的价值差异较大时, 平台仍
应选择较高的信息精准度. |
| 英文摘要 |
| From the perspective of advertising platform, excessive accuracy of information and market segmen-
tation would result in fewer advertisers participating in the auction, lower bids and reduced platform profits.
Based on the above problems, this study analyzed the information disclosure strategy of advertising platform
and investigated its impact on the advertisers’ bidding strategy and platform revenue. Through model analysis,
it is found that providing noisy information is better than providing accurate information, so the platform can
improve revenue by appropriately hiding or obscuring relevant information of users to influence the advertisers’
bidding behaviors. Furthermore, when the platform provides noisy information, the optimal accuracy should
be selected according to the conditions. When the users’ preference difference is large and the advertisers’ val-
uation difference is small, the platform should choose lower information accuracy to enhance the advertisers’
bidding motivation. On the contrary, when the preference difference is small and the valuation difference is
large, the platform should still choose higher information accuracy. |
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