军用技术创新中政府部门选择研发补贴形式的策略 |
Government departments’ strategy to decide the form of R&D subsidies in military technology innovation |
摘要点击 1399 全文点击 0 投稿时间:2018-02-23 修订日期:2020-01-14 |
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中文关键词 研发补贴;军用技术创新;军民协同;社会福利 |
英文关键词 R&D subsidy; military technology innovation; military-civil collaborative ; social welfare |
基金项目 |
作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | 海江涛 | 河南大学商学院 | 475004 | 仲伟俊 | 东南大学经济管理学院 | |
|
中文摘要 |
针对军用技术创新中政府部门提供补贴激励民营企业投入技术研发问题, 构建动态规划模型, 研究了单一企
业的最优技术投入以及多个竞争企业技术投入的马尔可夫完美均衡策略, 在此基础上, 讨论了政府部门如何在固定
额度补贴与按比例匹配补贴方式之间选择的策略问题. 研究结果表明: 与多个企业进行研发竞赛不同, 企业垄断技
术研发情况下, 其技术投入有两种不同的情形. 多个企业进行研发竞赛的情况下, 技术溢出效果存在使得企业技术
投入会有三种不同的情形. 政府选择研发补贴形式要考虑创新产品可能实现的社会福利、现有成熟产品给企业带
来的收益以及消费者剩余、参与企业数量、技术溢出效果等因素的影响. |
英文摘要 |
In order to encourage private enterprises to invest in technology research and development(R&D)
in military technology innovation, government departments always provide some subsidies to involved firms.
Using a dynamic programming model, the paper studies an individual firm’s optimal R&D investment decision
and non-cooperative firms’ symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium investment strategies. And then,
two different types of R&D subsidies are distinguished: one kind of subsidy is the fixed amount subsidy; the other kind
of R&D subsidy is to match the additional funding in proportion to firm’s R&D spending. The findings suggest
that technologies’ spillover effect has an important impact on R&D investment of non-cooperative enterprises.
There are two different circumstances of technology investment under the case of monopoly technology R&D,
while there are three different situations in the case of R&D competition. The strategy of governments to decide
the form of R&D subsidies is also obtained. The social welfare brought by innovation products, the benefits
and consumer surplus of existing mature products, the number of participating enterprises and the effect of
technological spillover effect should be taken into consideration in the process of government choosing the
form of subsidy. |
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