| 制造商与零售商合作推广与改进新产品的博弈分析 |
| Game analysis of new product promotion and improvement between manufacturer and retailer |
| 摘要点击 1900 全文点击 0 投稿时间：2018-01-06 修订日期：2019-01-16 |
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| 中文关键词 新产品；制造商；零售商；Stackelberg博弈；成本分担 |
| 英文关键词 new product; manufacturer; retailer; Stackelberg game; cost-sharing |
| 基金项目 国家社科基金（11BZZ028）; 天津市社科规划办重点项目（TJGL15-004）; 天津市教育委员会社会科学重大资助项目 (2014ZD14) |
| 作者 | 单位 | 邮编 | | 李振东 | 天津大学管理与经济学部 | 300072 | | 张慧颖 | 天津大学管理与经济学部 | |
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| 中文摘要 |
| 针对零售商不愿推广高市场风险的新产品，制造商因信息渠道限制不能在新产品的改进过程中有效结合市 场需求的情况，研究了制造商与零售商关于推广与改进新产品的最佳合作策略问题. 比较分析了制造商对零售商 有、无推广成本分担时的 Stackelberg 博弈，以及双方集中决策下的合作博弈. 结果表明，集中式决策下的各方利 润值及最优策略都要优于分散式决策下的情形; 当制造商与零售商不能形成集中式决策时，制造商通过给予零售 商一定比例的推广成本补贴，能显著改进双方合作的效率，使双方利润都得到增加，且此时新产品的市场契合度 和认知度的提升速度也得到加快. |
| 英文摘要 |
| As a result of relatively high market risks, retailers usually do not want to promote new products. In addition, manufacturers often fail to effectively combine with market requirements during product improvement process. Targeted at these problems, this paper studies the optimal strategies of new product promotion and improvement between manufacturer and retailer. Through the comparative study of Stackelberg game when manufacturer willing or unwilling to share the promotion cost of retailer, and cooperation game under centralized decision, it is found that all optimal strategies and two parties’ maximum pro?ts under centralized decision condition are superior to those under decentralized decision condition. Compared to the non cost-sharing model under the decentralized decision, when manufacturers provide cost subsidy for retailers’ promotion activities, pro?ts of two sides are increased, the growth rates of new product ?t degree with market demand and recognition degree will also be increased. |
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