首页 | 新闻公告 | 投稿须知 | 编委会 | 关于杂志 | 订阅 | 留言FAQ | 广告服务 | 相关链接 | 下载区 | 联系我们

合作研发中的双边道德风险和利益分配
Bilateral moral hazard and profit sharing of cooperative R&D
摘要点击 2425  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2011-06-20  修订日期:2012-05-31
  查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
中文关键词  合作研发;双边道德风险;谈判能力;研发能力;利益分配
英文关键词  cooperative R&D; bilateral moral hazard; bargaining power; R&D productivity; profit sharing
基金项目  国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028)
作者单位E-mail
孟卫东 重庆大学 mengweidong@cqu.edu.cn 
代建生 重庆大学 jiansheng.dai@163.com 
中文摘要
      针对合作研发中研发能力和谈判能力对利益分配和研发模式的影响, 运用纳什谈判解,构建了存在双边道德风险的合作研发联合生产模型.研究表明:合作研发实现的净收益随参与方研发能力的增强而增大.分析了合作双方研发能力和谈判能力对最优线性分配比例的影响,得到以下结论:一方所得分配比例随自身研发能力的增强而增大,随对方研发能力的增强而减小,但与双方的谈判能力无关. 考察了研发模式的选择与研发能力的关系:只有当合作研发能实现正的合作净剩余时,企业才会采用合作研发的模式;当研发能力差距悬殊时,实力较弱一方应将研发业务外包给实力较强一方.
英文摘要
      This paper investigates how R&D capacity and bargaining power affect profit sharing and R&D modes.By virtue of Nash bargaining solution, a joint production model is established for cooperative R&D with double moral hazard. It shows that net income realized increases when R&D capacity of the participants improves. It analyzes how R&D capacity and bargaining power affect the optimal linear sharing ratio, it is concluded that the share of a certain participant,independent of bargaining power of both two parties, becomes larger with its own R&D capacity stronger. It investigates the relationship between R&D model and R&D capacity and points out that cooperative R&D mode would be taken only when there exists positive net cooperative residual. When gap between R&D capacities of both the two participants in cooperative R&D is extraordinary large, one party with relatively weak R&D capacity would outsource R\&D to the other party with relatively strong R&D capacity.
相关附件:   20110620001的修改说明  修改说明  文章20110620001的修改说明  第四次修改说明  第五次修改说明  关于作者署名顺序的说明  第六次修改说明
关闭

版权所有 © 2007 《系统工程学报》
通讯地址:天津市卫津路92号天津大学25教学楼A区908室 邮编:300072
联系电话/传真:022-27403197 电子信箱: jse@tju.edu.cn