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基于不同信息条件下的动态互惠效应研究
Dynamic Reciprocal Effect Research Based on Different Information Conditions
摘要点击 2216  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2011-06-09  修订日期:2012-05-14
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中文关键词  信息;互惠;契约;激励
英文关键词   information, reciprocity, contract, motivation
基金项目  
作者单位E-mail
师伟 重庆大学 shiwei_eagle@163.com 
蒲勇健 重庆大学  
中文摘要
      本文以Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger(2004)的序贯互惠模型为基础,考察在不同信息条件下,植入参与者互惠偏好所产生的激励效应。结论表明,在完全信息条件下,当代理人具有足够的互惠偏好时,委托人将放弃强制契约,并赋予代理人更大的自由;当委托人具有互惠偏好时,代理人在最后一期博弈之前将产生讨好委托人的动机,并且这种动机将有效激励代理人努力工作。在不完全信息条件下,相对于理性假设下的最优情况而言,代理人互惠偏好的植入能够在不降低其努力水平的前提下,使委托人获得改善其物质效用收益的可能。
英文摘要
      According to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s theory of sequential reciprocity, this paper researches on the reciprocal motivation effect under different information conditions. The model concludes that under complete information condition, when agent have enough reciprocal preference, principal will quit enforceable contract and give agent more freedom, and When principal have reciprocal preference, agent will have incentive to blandish principal before the final game, and this motivates agent to hard work. In addition, under incomplete information condition, relative to the optimization of rational condition, incorporating agent’s reciprocal preference will give principal the opportunity to obtain more material utility on the premise that agent’s effort level is not reduced.
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