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基于不完全契约的PPP剩余控制权配置模型研究
Theoretical Study on the Allocation of Residual Control Rights in the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) under Incomplete Contracts
摘要点击 2666  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2011-04-02  修订日期:2012-08-16
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中文关键词  PPP ;不完全契约;剩余控制权配置;收益分配;投入激励
英文关键词   PPP; Incomplete contract; allocation of residual control rights; allocation of income; motivation of investment
基金项目  教育部 教育部人文社科一般项目(11YJA63017)国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)
作者单位E-mail
孙慧 天津大学管理学院工程管理系 bighui2000@sina.com 
中文摘要
      PPP是公共部门与私人部门合作提供公共产品(或服务)的重要模式。本文强调PPP的契约本质,从不完全契约视角出发,研究PPP模式下剩余控制权配置对公私双方投入的影响。通过构建数学模型分析PPP背景下剩余控制权配置与合作双方投入激励之间的关系,研究指出在初始契约规定收益分配方案的情况下,最优的剩余控制权配置范围与初始契约中的收益分配比例、合作双方的技术因素以及双方对预期最终收益的乐观程度有关。
英文摘要
      PPP is an important model that the public sectors and private ones collaborate to supply the public goods and public service. This paper impresses that the genuine nature of PPP is the contract, and research the affect of the residual control rights allocation on parties’ investment level from the perspective of the incomplete contract. Through establishing math model to analyze the relationship between residual control rights allocation and the motivation of both parties’ investment under the background of PPP, and points out that the optimal allocation of residual control rights depends on the parties’ respective degree of optimism of the expectation on the final return, both parties’ technological factors, and the allocation of income provided by the initial contract when there is a proposal of income allocation existed in the initial contract.
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