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基于利益冲突视角的互惠激励效应研究
Reciprocal Motivations Research Based on Interest Conflict
摘要点击 2288  全文点击 0  投稿时间:2011-03-22  修订日期:2012-05-14
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中文关键词  互惠;利益;理性;收敛
英文关键词  reciprocity, interest, rationality, convergence
基金项目  
作者单位E-mail
蒲勇健 重庆大学 shiwei_eagle@163.com 
师伟 重庆大学 shiwei_eagle@163.com 
中文摘要
      本文以Dufwenberg和Kirchsteiger(2004)的序贯互惠模型为基础,构建了基于委托人与经理人两期博弈的动态互惠模型。模型结论表明,在植入了委托人互惠偏好动机时,经理人的最优决策行为将发生一定程度的收敛,并且在一定条件下,委托人的收益将大于理性条件下的收益水平。本文证明了在动态策略坏境中,互惠依然具有显著的激励作用,互惠的存在迫使经理人采取有利于委托人的策略,从而在客观上起到了契约的作用。此外,本文还对模型的某些扩展性进行了讨论。
英文摘要
      According to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s theory of sequential reciprocity, this paper constructs a two-period dynamic reciprocal model based on behaviors of principal and managers. The model concludes that when considering principal’s reciprocal motivation, managers’ optimal decision behavior will occur some degree of convergence, and under certain conditions, principal’s profit will be greater than the income level under the condition of rationality. This paper proves that in a dynamic strategy environment, reciprocity still has significant incentive effect, and the existence of reciprocal preference forces managers to take strategies in favor of principal, which objectively plays a role of contract. In addition, this paper also discusses some aspects of the expansibility of the model.
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