首页 | 新闻公告 | 投稿须知 | 编委会 | 关于杂志 | 订阅 | 留言FAQ | 广告服务 | 相关链接 | 下载区 | 联系我们

基于Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot竞争的报废产品回收激励与监督问题
Incentive and Supervision Problem for EOL Products Recovery in Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot Competition
摘要点击 4770  全文点击 27  投稿时间:2010-07-16  修订日期:2011-07-17
  查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
中文关键词  变分不等式;网络均衡模型;激励监督策略;报废产品
英文关键词  variational inequality; network equilibrium model; incentive and supervision strategies;EOL products
基金项目  国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)
作者单位E-mail
杨玉香 中国计量学院经济与管理学院 yyx_bj2005@126.com 
周根贵 浙江工业大学经贸管理学院 ggzhou@zjut.edu.cn 
中文摘要
      利用双层规划、均衡理论及变分不等式研究工具,建立基于Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot竞争的报废产品回收激励监督双层决策系统,上层考虑环保部门以较低的激励监督成本尽可能提高环境效益为目标,下层描述了网络中各决策者在不同激励监督策略下的竞争行为。给出了这一问题的求解策略,并通过算例研究激励监督机制的效果,为环保部门制定有效的激励监督策略提供了理论支持。
英文摘要
      By using the study methods of bi-level programming, equilibrium theory and variational inequality, an incentive and supervision bi-level decision model for end-of-life products recovery in Stackelberg--Nash--Cournot Competition is established. The upper level model accounts for that the environmental protection department promotes possibly environmental benefit at lower incentive and supervision costs. The lower level model describes the competitive behavior of the various decision-makers under different incentive and supervision strategies. A solution method is built. Finally, a numerical example is solved to illustrate the effect of incentive and supervision strategies . The results provide theoretic support for the environmental protection department to design effective policies.
相关附件:   修改说明.doc  修改说明  20100716002提交.zip  压缩包  20100716002-2010-5-1提交.zip  2010-5-5单栏排版-提交.zip  压缩包.zip  2011-6-1提交.zip  2011-6-12.zip  7-10.zip
关闭

版权所有 © 2007 《系统工程学报》
通讯地址:天津市卫津路92号天津大学25教学楼A区908室 邮编:300072
联系电话/传真:022-27403197 电子信箱: jse@tju.edu.cn